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At the last count, there were 231 speeches and articles 
which started, "Little did James Marshall realize on that fateful 
day in 1849, when he discovered gold at Sutter's Mill in 
California...". This is the 232nd.
Little did James Marshall realize on that fateful day in 
1849, when he discovered gold at Sutter's Mill in California, 
that he would be influencing the development of water law in 
Colorado.
However, the correlation between the mining law developed by 
the gold miners of California in 1849 and the 1850s carried over 
into the development of water law in Colorado beginning ten years 
later.
Frank Trelease, in his "Water Law Cases and Materials", West
Publishing Company, 1967, says:
The doctrine of prior appropriation is a very 
different form of water law, dominant in the 
eighteen western continental states, includ­
ing Alaska. Its two cardinal principles are 
that beneficial use of water, not land 
ownership, is the basis of the right to 
water, and that priority of use, not equality 
of right, is the basis of the division of 
water between appropriators when there is not 
enough for all. The place of use is not 
limited to the stream bank, as in riparian 
law, and with few exceptions the water can be 
used anywhere it is needed. An appropriation 
is always stated in terms of the right to 
take a definite quantity of water. Developed 
in the arid west, appropriation law is 
usually thought of as a system for water- 
short areas, where there is not enough for 
everyone, not even for all riparian owners.
The allocation of water among appropriators 
according to priority may need some explana­
tion. On a typical western stream where 
there are many irrigators with water rights 
initiated at different times, there may be 
water for all while the mountain snowpacks 
melt and the stream is high. As the quantity 
of water decreases during the dry summer, the 
diversion works of the appropriators are shut 
off in inverse order of priority. The last 
ditch is the first closed, and the earliest 
is never closed. The right of the senior 
appropriator extends both upstream and down­
stream. He may take water needed by a junior 
appropriator below him, while the junior 
appropriator upstream must permit the water 
to go past his point of diversion when it is 
needed to supply the senior rights. The 
burden of shortage thus falls on those with 
the later rights, and there is no proration 
in times of scarcity.
The history of this doctrine is a fascinating 
chapter in the story of the growth of 
American laws and institutions. At the 
mid-point of the 19th century, the common law 
of waters had definitely crystalized into the 
law of riparian rights. At this same time, 
the doctrine of prior appropriation spontane­
ously developed in the west to meet the needs 
of pioneers who came to the vast open spaces 
in search of gold, land and homes. Although 
it has sometimes been attempted, by doubtful 
analogies, to trace the doctrine from rather 
obscure early statements found in pre­
riparian English law, or from the early 
Massachusetts Mill Acts, or from Spanish law, 
the people who originated the doctrine were 
not versed in these by-ways of legal learn­
ing. They were miners who crowded into the 
gold fields of California in 1849. Swarming 
over lands previously uninhabited, they took 
the gold with the tacit permission of the 
true owner, the United States. After a 
lawless period, the miners, essentially 
law-abiding people from the eastern and 
mid-western states, organized "mining 
districts" to create some semblance of order 
on the then ungoverned public domain. These
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de facto governments promulgated rules and 
adopted customs regulating mining claims, and 
of equal importance, the right to use water 
to wash the gold from the gravel in which it 
was found. They established essentially the 
same rule for ownership of mining claims and 
for the right to use water. The discoverer 
of a mine was protected against all who tried 
to jump his claim. The first user of water 
was protected against later takers. This 
rule was known as prior appropriation —  the 
law of the first taker.
When permanent settlers took up land for 
agricultural purposes and recognized the need 
for irrigation, they adapted to their 
purposes the water law evolved by the miners.
It was a doctrine especially well suited for 
a pioneering economy based upon the settle­
ment of vacant lands. The first settler to 
come into a valley chose his land. If 
irrigation water was needed, he dug a ditch 
from the stream to his land. Whether his 
land was located on the stream or not was 
immaterial, since there was no one to object 
to his use of the water. The second settler 
to follow him into the valley had to respect 
the first settler's homestead and take second 
choice of the land, and he had to respect the 
first appropriator's right to the water and 
irrigate his lands out of what was left. 1/
These customary appropriations were confirmed 
and authorized by state and territorial 
decisions and statutes, and insofar as made 
on the public domain, by federal statutes.
As Hutchins says in his "Selected Problems in the Law of
Water Rights in the West":
. . . the appropriative principle in the form 
in which it is now recognized throughout the 
West —  embodying the essential element of 
priority —  is not traceable to Mexican laws 
and customs, but sprang from the requirements 
of a mining region for protection in the use 
of water supplies needed to work the mining 
claims. . . .  A rule was adopted as to the
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possessory right to mining claims, giving the 
first locator of the claim the superior right 
to the same as against all later comers, and 
the same rule was applied to appropriations 
of water for the purpose of working mining 
claims, this element of superior right to the 
one who was prior in time having been there­
tofore unknown in the civil or common law 
governing waters or in the civil laws modi­
fied by Spanish-Mexican law. 2/
Citing Kinney, C.S., a Treatise on the Law of 
Irrigation and Water Rights, 2nd Ed., Vol. II,
Sec. 776, pp. 1345-1346.
Gold was first discovered on the banks of Cherry Creek in 
1858, 3/ but it wasn't long until prospectors worked their way 
west into the mountains in search of more of the precious metal. 
One of the first expeditions headed for what is now Central City.
As a dues-paying member of the Boulder Chamber of Commerce, 
I am pleased to report that the discoverers of gold at Central 
City spent the week before that discovery camping at the foot of 
the Red Rocks, which is visible from my office window, and which 
are found at the mouth of Boulder Canyon.
As the Central City area developed, it became a series of 
three communities —  first Blackhawk, then Central City, then 
Nevadaville, or Nevada, as it was more generally known. The 
miners in the various communities adopted their own regulations. 
For example, on July 30, 1859, the miners of Gold Hill, also near 
Boulder, who had previously formed what was known as Mountain 
District No. 1, adopted six resolutions and the second one reads 
as follows, according to "The History of Gold Hill", by Nolie 
Mumey:
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RESOLVED, that each miner shall be entitled 
to take and hold only one mountain claim and 
one water claim for the purpose of sluicing 
gold from the quartz, and one gulch claim by 
a Preemption. Each quartz claim may not be 
more than 100 feet in length and extend not 
more than 25 feet on each side, the stakes 
marking the ends of the claim. Each water 
claim may be not more than 33 feet in length 
up and down the stream and may extend not 
more than 20 feet from each bank. Each gulch 
claim may not be more than 100 feet in length 
and 50 in weadth [sic]. 4/
The Town of Nevada, also known as Nevadaville, adopted its 
own laws on May 25, 1861. The preamble of those laws reads as 
follows:
WHEREAS, it has been, and is universally 
acknowledged by all civilized communities, 
that government is necessary for the good 
understanding of the People forming such 
government; - and WHEREAS, we the Miners of 
Nevada Gold Mining District have no civil 
government extended to us, by the Authorities 
of the United States, of the Territory in 
which we now reside; - in mass meeting 
assemble do, for the protection of all our 
rights, adopt the following Constitution and 
By Laws: -
Section 8 of Article 2 provides:
[M]iners working Load claims shall be enti­
tled to One Half the Water from the gulch; - 
provided, however, said water so used shall 
not be taken to a greater distance than One 
hundred feet in a line from said gulch, but 
that those so using it, shall return it to 
the gulch by a ditch, unless it be needed for 
use by parties below; - in which case, those 
last using it, shall conduct it in a Ditch as 
prescribed above.
Section 10, Article 3, is entitled "Ditches” and reads as 
follows:
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When Water Companies are engaged in bringing 
Water into any portion of the mines, they 
shall have the right of way secured to them, 
and may pass over any claim, road or ditch: - 
Provided, the water shall be so guarded as to 
not interfere with any vested right. 5/
The territory of Jefferson was created by act of Congress in
October 1859 and the territorial legislature wasted no time in
adopting an irrigation law, which adopted the priority system of
water for mining. That law provides:
Sec. 1. That any person or persons settling 
upon any stream and claiming one hundred and 
sixty acres or less for farming or gardening 
purposes, and claiming the privilege of using 
the water of said stream for purposes of 
irrigation, shall be entitled to the same as 
hereinafter provided.
Sec. 2 . No person or persons making subse­
quent claims above said first claimant, shall 
turn out of its original channel the waters 
of such stream in such a manner as to deprive 
said first claimant of the irrigation privi­
leges provided in section first.
Sec. 3. That nothing in section second shall 
be so construed as to deprive agricultural­
ists remote from streams from applying the
waters thereof to irrigation purposes, and 
they shall have the right to make the neces­
sary dams, ditches and other improvements for 
that purpose, but shall be liable for damages 
resulting therefrom.
Sec. 4. Persons wishing to irrigate lands
shall not be liable to an action of trespass 
for entering upon the claims of other
persons, for the purpose of making a ditch
and bringing water across said other person's 
claim; provided, they shall pay all damages 
sustained by said other persons, to be deter­
mined by referees as in other cases. 6/
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In 1861, the Colorado territorial legislature adopted an act
which included the following provision:
That when any person, owning claims in such 
locality, has not sufficient length of area 
exposed to said stream in order to obtain a 
sufficient fall of water necessary to irri­
gate his land, or that his farm or land, used 
by him for agricultural purposes, is too far 
removed from said stream and that he has no 
water facilities on those lands, he shall be 
entitled to a right of way through the farms 
or tracts of land which lie between him and 
said stream, or the farms or tracts of land 
which lie above and below him on said stream, 
for the purposes as hereinabove stated. 7/
I don't know who the representative was in the territorial
legislature from Hardscrabble Creek, a tributary of the Arkansas
River which flows into the Arkansas near the Town of Portland in
what is now Fremont County, but he was alert because Section 4 of
that same act provides:
That in case the volume of water in said 
stream or river shall not be sufficient to 
supply the continual wants of the entire 
country through which it passes, then the 
nearest justice of the peace shall appoint 
three commissioners as hereinafter provided, 
whose duty it shall be to apportion, in a 
just and equitable proportion, a certain 
amount of said water upon certain or alter­
nate weekly days to different localities, as 
they may, in their judgment, think best for 
the interests of all parties concerned, and 
with a due regard to the legal rights of all; 
provided, that this section shall not apply 
to persons occupying land on what is known as 
Hardscrabble Creek, a tributary of the 
Arkansas River; but upon said stream each 
occupant shall be allowed sufficient water to 
irrigate one hundred and sixty acres of land, 
if there shall be sufficient for that 
purpose; and if insufficient, then the
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occupant nearest the source of said stream 
shall be first supplied. 8/
Section 11 of that act provided:
That the provisions of this act shall also 
entail upon the parties using water, as 
provided above, the careful management and 
control of said water, that in their waste 
they shall not injure any one; and if so 
injured, damages shall be assessed as herein­
before provided. 9/
Hardscrabble Creek was not the only local area that received 
special attention. In 1872, the legislature passed an act 
concerning irrigation in El Paso County, which provided for the 
appointment of commissioners who were empowered to levy a tax 
within the county upon lands using water for irrigation in 
proportion to the amount of water used by each person to reim­
burse the commissioners for their fees in supervising the distri­
bution of water and protecting against breaking a ditch or 
wasting water. 10/
We hear a great deal today about ideas for charging costs of 
water administration to water users, and I think there are very 
few of us in this audience who realize that we are 115 years 
behind the times. Truly, there is nothing new in water law.
Continuing the case-by-case administration of water, in 1872 
the legislature adopted an act which made the laws concerning 
ditches in Conejos and Costilla Counties applicable to ditches in 
Huerfano County. 11/ A month later, the same act was amended
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again to make the Costilla and Conejos County rules applicable 
also to Las Animas County. 12/
Apparently nobody ever heard of special legislation in those 
days, because in 1874, in apparent response to the anguished 
pleas of the representative from Las Animas County, the legisla­
ture passed a law providing:
That the "Acequia" which is about to be 
constructed by the inhabitants on the river 
of San Francisco, in the County of Las 
Animas, Territory of Colorado, and which 
takes its lead at the south or west side of 
Manual Ocana's farm, and runs thence in an 
easterly course until it reaches the farm of 
Seferino Derrera, be recognized by the name 
of [Acequia Madre], or Main Ditch.
Sec. 2. That the Superintendent of this 
Acequia be elected according to section one
(1) of the Revised Statutes of Colorado, page 
365, that he be empowered to call out all 
persons using water from the Acequia, respec­
tively to repair the Acequia, or Dam, and he 
who shall fail to supply his share of work on 
the Acequia, or Dam, shall be liable to a 
fine imposed by the Superintendent in a sum 
not less than two (2), nor more than six (6) 
dollars for each and every day he is absent 
when required. And said sum shall be applied 
to the benefit of said Acequia. 13/
Two years later, the legislature adopted an act that applied
only to meadowlands in Huerfano County in certain months. That
act, which was approved on February 10, 1876, said:
That from and after the passage of this act, 
it shall be unlawful for any person to divert 
the water of any stream, in the county of 
Huerfano from and after the 20th day of June, 
until the 31st day of August, of each year, 
from its natural course, for the purpose of 
irrigating meadow or hay land. 14/
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I am not exactly sure of the purpose of that statute unless there 
was a great surplus of hay in Huerfano County in 1876.
When a Constitution for Colorado was adopted on March 14, 
1876 (it became effective August 1, 1876 when the President of
the United States issued a proclamation declaring Colorado 
admitted to the Union), it contained an article on irrigation 
containing four sections.
The first section stated:
The water of every natural stream not hereto­
fore appropriated, within the state of 
Colorado, is hereby declared to be the 
property of the public, and the same is 
dedicated to the use of the people of the 
state, subject to appropriation as herein­
after provided. 15/
The second provided:
The right to divert the unappropriated waters 
of any natural stream to beneficial uses 
shall never be denied. Priority of appropri­
ation shall give the better right as between 
those using the water for the same purpose; 
but when the waters of any natural stream are 
not sufficient for the service of all those 
desiring the use of the same, those using the 
water for domestic purposes shall have the 
preference over those claiming for any other 
purpose, and those using the water for 
agricultural purposes shall have preference 
over those using the same for manufacturing 
purposes. 16/
The third section provided for rights of way for ditches, 
canals and flumes for carrying water and for drainage, upon 
payment of just compensation, 17/ and the fourth provided county
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commissioners could fix reasonable maximum rates for the use of 
water. 18/
These four sections have served us well for almost 110 
years.
The Colorado Supreme Court was quick to announce that the 
appropriation doctrine, as established by the California and 
Colorado miners, was the proper doctrine for Colorado.
In Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., the Court said:
We conclude, then, that the common law 
doctrine giving the riparian owner a right to 
the flow of water in its natural channel upon 
and over his lands, even though he makes no 
beneficial use thereof, is inapplicable to 
Colorado. Imperative necessity, unknown to 
the countries which gave it birth, compels 
the recognition of another doctrine in 
conflict therewith. And we hold that, in the 
absence of express statutes to the contrary, 
the first appropriator of water from a 
natural stream for a beneficial purpose has, 
with the qualifications contained in the 
constitution, a prior right thereto, to the 
extent of such appropriation. 19/
The first adjudication act was adopted in 1879 and provided 
for the county commissioners to consider applications for water 
rights and also provided for the appointment of a referee to hear 
the testimony, provided for pro rating a water right when there 
was not enough to serve everyone who was entitled to be served 
under that water right, established irrigation districts for the 
first time, authorized water commissioners for each of the 
districts and set forth their duties, provided for court 
adjudication of priority of appropriation and the appointment of
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a referee by the court, the giving of notice and all of the 
things which we are used to now in the determination of water 
rights. That same law provided, for the first time, for the 
irrigation of meadow lands by overflow, a practice which was 
carried on for many, many years. It allowed the owners of a
reservoir to use the streams for carriage of water from the
reservoir and made the owners of reservoirs 1iable for all
damages arising from leakage or overflow of the waters therefrom 
or by floods caused by breaking the embankments of such 
reservoirs. 20/
However, the adjudication act which served the state for 38 
years was adopted in February of 1881 and was the method for 
obtaining decrees for irrigation until the adjudication act of 
1919 was adopted. 21/
It will be noticed, however, that all of the statutes to 
which I have referred have been for the use of water for purposes 
of irrigation. It was not until 1903, when Chapter 130 of the 
Session Laws of that year was adopted on April 11th, 22/ which 
allowed the owners of water rights derived from any natural 
stream, water course or any other source acquired for appropria­
tion and use for any beneficial purpose other than irrigation, to 
have his or their right thereto established and decreed by the 
District Court having jurisdiction of the adjudication of water 
rights for irrigation purposes. It adopted the same method of
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application for decree, notice, etc., that had been utilized 
since 1881.
Because there had been no means for the owner of a water 
right to obtain judicial confirmation of that right prior to 
1903, the courts gave the applicant the true date of priority 
regardless of the intervention of general or supplemental adjudi­
cations for irrigation purposes prior to the application for 
purposes other than irrigation.
This practice was ratified when the United States in its 
federal claims cases sought the true date of appropriation and, 
in all cases where that true date preceded decrees granted, was 
given its true date of appropriation. 23/
Another adjudication act was adopted in 1943 24/ and then in 
1969 came what is commonly known as the 1969 Pension Plan for 
Water Lawyers or more formally the "Water Right Determination and 
Administration Act of 1969". 25/
So much for the development of the adjudication of streams. 
However, one of the most vexing problems for the people of 
the State of Colorado was the construction, after World War II, 
of thousands of tributary wells, particularly in the South 
Platte, Arkansas and Rio Grande drainages.
As electric power became available to farmers through the 
Rural Electrification Act which was passed in 1935, more and more 
farmers were supplementing their direct flow rights with wells. 
Owners of surface rights did not complain about the construction
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of irrigation wells until thousands of them had been drilled. 
Suddenly the surface stream appropriators woke up to the fact 
that there was not as much water flowing in the streams as there 
had been historically and, putting two and two together, decided 
that the tributary wells were taking water out of the stream and 
reducing the quantity of water available for direct flow decrees.
Litigation was stalled for a long time because, in my 
opinion, many of the farmers not only had wells but also had 
surface rights and did not want to institute litigation which 
might adversely affect one or the other.
However, in 1966, when there was not sufficient water in the 
Arkansas River to fill the adjudicated rights of downstream users 
having priority dates as early as 1887, the owners of these 
rights placed a call on the river. On June 24, the Division 
Engineer notified Roger Fellhauer to cease pumping until further 
notice. The defendant, asserting that the 1965 act giving the 
State Engineer the power to regulate wells was unconstitu­
tional, 26/ refused to comply with the order and suit was 
instituted. The court concluded that the State Engineer's order 
was invalid because he ordered only 39 of more than 1600 major 
wells shut down and the Supreme Court said this was discrim­
inating against Mr. Fellhauer, and violated the equal protection 
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitu­
tion and of the due process clause in article II, section 25 of 
the Colorado Constitution. 27/
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However, the court did state that the requirements for 
constitutional regulation of wells under the 1965 Act required 
compliance with three requirements:
(1) The regulation must be under and in 
compliance with reasonable rules, 
regulations, standards and a plan 
established by the state engineer prior 
to the issuance of the regulative 
orders.
(2) Reasonable lessening of material injury 
to senior rights must be accomplished by 
the regulation of the wells.
(3) If by placing conditions upon the use of 
a well, or upon its owner, some or all 
of its water can be placed to a benefi­
cial use by the owner without material 
injury to senior users, such conditions 
should be made. 28/
Following this decision, the State Engineer, with varying 
degrees of success, established rules and regulations in each of 
the major ground water producing divisions as to the use of water 
from tributary wells. Practically all of these regulations have 
been the subject of much litigation, but nevertheless regulations 
in some degree are in effect throughout the state.
In the meantime, the thorny question of nontributary wells 
had been concerning the legislature since as early as 1957. In 
that year, an underground water act was passed which established 
a ground water commission and provided for the determination by 
the commission of designated ground water basins and also estab­
lished a procedure for someone desiring to construct a well in a 
designated ground water basin to obtain a conditional and final
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permit. The commission was also empowered to establish reason­
able ground water pumping levels in areas having a common 
designated ground water supply and provided:
Water in wells shall not be deemed available 
until the water right therefor or withdrawal 
therefrom of the amount called for by such 
right would, contrary to the declared policy 
of this article, unreasonably affect any 
prior water right, or result in withdrawing 
the ground water supply at a rate materially 
in excess of the reasonably anticipated 
average rate of future recharge. 29/
This last provision would have prevented the construction of 
any wells in most of the designated basins in Colorado because 
withdrawal of water from wells in those areas is a mining opera­
tion and the recharge is negligible. In addition, the well 
owners of Colorado disliked having a central body with as much 
authority as the 1957 act gave the Ground Water Commission. 
Therefore, in 1965, the 1957 act was repealed and a new ground 
water and ground water management district act was enacted. This 
is the act which, with amendments, now controls the construction 
of wells in designated basins. 30/
The 1965 act provided for the formation of management 
districts with boards of directors which had authority to adopt 
local rules and regulations which controlled unless modified by 
the Ground Water Commission. The 1965 act also provided for 
permits to construct wells outside designated areas. Under this 
act, numerous designated ground water basins were established,
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and in most of them, ground water management districts were 
formed and boards elected.
In Whitten v. Coit, decided September 9, 1963, the Colorado 
Supreme Court had held that there had been no previous legisla­
tion affecting nontributary ground water and the court said:
If, however, underground water does not 
belong to the river and does not contribute 
to a natural stream it is not public water 
and is not subject to the doctrine of prior 
appropriation. 31/
The court also held:
Holding as we do that underground waters 
which are not tributary to any natural stream 
are not subject to the doctrine of appropria­
tion, it necessarily follows that the origi­
nal decree entered by Judge Littler in the 
adjudication proceedings of 1948, under which 
the court purported to award priorities to 
the plaintiffs in this action, were void for 
want of jurisdiction over the subject matter 
and for a lack of power to adjudicate such 
rights. 32/
The legislature, thinking it was solving the Whitten v. Coit 
problem, passed Senate Bill 213 in 1973, which reads with refer­
ence to the issuance of a well permit for water outside a 
designated basin:
. . . except that, in considering whether the
permit shall be issued, only that quantity of 
water underlying the land owned by the 
applicant or by the owners of the area, by 
their consent, to be served is considered to 
be unappropriated; the minimum useful life of 
the aquifer is one hundred years, assuming 
that there is no substantial artificial 
recharge within said period; and that no 
material injury to vested water rights would 
result from the issuance of said permit. The
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state engineer may adopt rules and regula­
tions to assist in, but not as a prerequisite 
to, the granting or denial of "permits to 
construct wells" and for the administration 
of this underground water. 33/
Water lawyers were relieved to have the Whitten v. Coit 
problem resolved and a large number of well permits were obtained 
and many of those went to decree in the water court.
All was serene until the decision in July of 1983 in the 
case of State of Colorado Dept, of Natural Resources, et al. v.
Southwestern Colo. Water Cons. Dist., et al., generally known as 
the "Huston" case. 34/ In that decision, the Colorado Supreme 
Court held:
Because we conclude that nontributary 
ground water is not subject to appropriation 
under the Colorado Constitution or to adjudi­
cation under the Water Right Determination 
and Administration Act of 1969, article 92 of 
title 37, C.R.S. 1973 (1982 Supp.) (the 1969 
Act), we hold that all applications for 
adjudication of rights to nontributary ground 
water under the 1969 Act must be dismissed.
* *  * *
Reading these statutory provisions together 
leads inescapably to the conclusion that the 
water right determination proceedings author­
ized by section 37-92-302(1)(a) do not extend 
to rights in nontributary ground water. See 
also section 37-82-101(1), C.R.S. 1973 (1982
Supp.). This result is implicit in the 
analysis on which we based our holding in 
State ex rel. Danielson v. Vickroy, supra, 
that a water judge has no jurisdiction over 
matters involving designated ground water. 35/
To say that this ruling was a bombshell is to be guilty of
understatement.
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All of the water lawyers who had obtained decrees in the 
water court for nontributary water under Senate Bill 213 joined 
forces to obtain the passage of a curative statute. On October 
11, 1983, the legislature passed Senate Bill No. 439 which 
provided:
Water matters include determinations of 
rights to nontributary ground water outside 
of designated ground water basins. Judgments 
and decrees entered prior to the effective 
date of this subsection (1) , as amended, in 
accordance with the procedures of sections 
37-92-302 to 37-92-305 with respect to such 
ground water shall be given full effect and 
enforced according to the terms of such 
decrees. 36/
After the legislature had blessed existing decrees, it 
become necessary then for the legislature to redefine the whole 
matter of nontributary ground water and this was accomplished in 
the 1985 session of the legislature by the passage of Senate Bill 
No. 5. That bill provides for a number of things, but until the 
courts have had a chance to act on them, we don't know how the 
provisions are going to be interpreted. As my task is not to 
predict the future but to tell what is happened in the past, I 
will stop here.
I should not stop, however, without saying two things. If 
one wants a really learned discussion of the development of 
Colorado water law, certainly Justice Lohr's exposition in the 
Huston case should be consulted. Secondly, it has been a 
delightful excursion backward into time for me to review the
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development of Colorado water law, especially the efforts of the 
early territorial legislatures to solve the problems vexing the 
water users of that long-ago period.
Certainly, little did James Marshall realize on that fateful 
day in 1849, when he discovered gold at Sutter's Mill in 
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